2012 DOD Report on China

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Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012. US Department of Defense, May 18, 2012.
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf

Quote:

(a) At page 9 (under the heading of "Space and Counterspace Capabilities"):

"Over the past two years, China has also conducted increasingly complex close proximity operations between satellites while offering little in the way of transparency or explanation.

"China’s space and counterspace programs are facing some challenges in systems reliability. Communications satellites using China’s standard satellite launch platform, the DFH-4, have experienced failures leading to reduced lifespan or loss of the satellite. The recent surge in the number of China’s space launches also may be taking its toll. In August 2011, in the third satellite launch in seven days for China, a Long March 2C rocket (carrying an experimental Shijian 11 satellite), malfunctioned after liftoff and failed to deliver the satellite into orbit.

Note: DFH-4 (abbreviation for "Dong Fang Hong-4") satellite platform 东方红四号卫星平台

(b) At p 10,
(i) (under the heading Espionage"): "Chinese actors are the world’s most through greater investment in global networks. Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and persistent threat to US economic security.
(ii) (under the heading "Civil-Military Integration"): "For example, with increasing globaliza- tion and integration of information technolo- gies, companies such as Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, with their ties to the PRC govern- ment and PLA entities, pose potential challenges in the blurring lines between commercial and government/military-associated entities.

(c) At p 16 (under the heading "Cross-Strait Military Options"): "The PLA still faces limitations in its ability to conduct a full- scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan. * * * Currently, the PRC probably could not enforce a full military blockade, particularly in the face of third party intervention.

(d) In p 23 (in the section "Appendix 1: Size, Location, and Capabilities of Chinese Military Forces"):

"The JL-2 [submarine-launched missile] program has faced repeated delays, but may reach initial operating capability within the next two years.

"The follow-on to the SONG[-class diesel powered attack submarines (SS)] is the YUAN-class (a Type-039 variant), as many as four of which are already in service. The YUAN-class probably includes an air-independent power system. The SONG, YUAN, SHANG and the still-to-be-deployed new SSN-class all will eventually be capable of launching a new long-range ASCM.

Note: Type 041 submarine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_041_submarine
(According to the Chinese newspaper Science and Technology Daily (科技日报), this 041 class is equipped with an air-independent propulsion system developed by the 711th Research Institute of the China Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Group Corp 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一一研究所

(e) At p 24-25 (under the heading "Nuclear Forces"):

"China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of about 50-75 silo-based, liquid-fueled and road-mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs. This force is complemented by liquid-fueled, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled MRBMs for regional deterrence missions. By 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include additional CSS-10 [NATO code name for Dong Fen (DF)-10] Mod 2s, enhanced CSS-4s [DF-5s] and likely JL-2’s. The first two JIN-class SSBNs [094] are in operational service [since 2010, according to Wiki], but the associated JL-2 SLBM continues to undergo flight testing. The JIN-class/JL-2 combination may be operational within the next two years.

"The introduction of more mobile systems will create new command and control challenges for China’s leadership, which now confronts a different set of variables related to deployment and release authorities. For example, the PLA Navy has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing an SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles. Land- based mobile missiles may face similar command and control challenges in wartime.

choi

In quotation (d):

ASCM: anti-ship cruise missile