75th Anniversary of Battle of Midway

choi

Robert R. Garnett, The American Guts and Grit That Sank Japan at Midway; When his bosses hedged, Adm Chester Nimitz took a chance on a codebreaker—and surprised the enemy. Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2017 (op-ed).
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the ... t-midway-1496443248
http://www.ruthfullyyours.com/20 ... y-robert-r-garnett/

Quote:

(a) "in a windowless basement near the [US Pacific] fleet's Pearl Harbor headquarters, codebreakers under Cmdr [or Captain] Joe Rochefort pored over intercepted Japanese radio traffic. * * * Rochefort's team could decode about one-eighth of an average message, filling in the gaps by educated intuition. For example, the messages called the proximate Japanese objective 'AF.' But where was 'AF'? Midway, Rochefort concluded. The authorities in Washington scoffed. Why would Japan dispatch a massive armada to seize a tiny atoll?

Commander of Pacific Fleet (Dec 31, 1941-Nov 24, 1945) Admiral Chester W (for William) "Nimitz, responsible for millions of square miles of ocean, had scant means to repel the Japanese anywhere, let alone everywhere. With his fleet, and perhaps the entire Pacific war, at stake, 'I had to do a bit of hard thinking,' he would recall.

"As the Navy's heavyweights vacillated, Nimitz decided to gamble on the out-of-step Rochefort. He recalled his three carriers [Japanese thought 2: USS Enterprise and Hornet; they did not know USS Yorktown was capable, having badly wounded] from the South Pacific to defend Midway.

(b) "Three weeks later [after the Battle of Midway], flying to San Francisco to confer with his Washington superior, Nimitz was shaken but uninjured when his seaplane, while landing, struck floating debris and flipped over. As the capsized plane sank, he stepped aboard a small crash boat, where he stood watching rescue operations.

" 'Sit down, you!' the coxswain barked—before noticing, with horror, his faux pas. He stumbled out apologies.

"Nimitz sat down. 'Stick to your guns, sailor,' he said. 'You were quite right.'


Note:
(a)
(i) There is no need to read the rest, because quotation 1 shows the main thesis of the article is indisputably false.
(ii) Take notice the author is a professor of English literature, not with a military background.

(b)
(i) Midway Atoll
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midway_Atoll
(View the map whose caption reads: Map showing the location of Midway Atoll in the Hawaiian island chain)

Quote:

"Midway Atoll is an unorganized, unincorporated territory of the United States. Midway continues to be the only island in the Hawaiian archipelago that is not part of the state of Hawaii. Unlike the other Hawaiian islands, Midway observes Samoa Time (UTC-11:00, ie, eleven hours behind Coordinated Universal Time), which is one hour behind the time in the state of Hawaii")

"The atoll was sighted on July 5, 1859, by Captain NC Middlebrooks * * * of the sealing ship Gambia * * * [who] claimed Midway for the United States

(ii)
(A) time zone
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_zone

View the world maps (there are two). Midway Atoll is UTC-11, whereas Haiwaii, UTC-10. Take notice Hawaii island chain (including Midway Atoll) is in northern hemisphere, but Samoa (as well as American Samoa), in the southern hemisphere.
(B) Samoa Time Zone
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samoa_Time_Zone

Quote:

"The zone includes the US territory of American Samoa, as well as the Midway Islands * * *

"The nation of Samoa also observed the same time as the Samoa Time Zone until it moved across the International Date Line at the end of Dec 29, 2011; it is now 24 hours (25 hours in summer) ahead of American Samoa.

(c) bird-eye view of the battle:

Battle of Midway 75th. US Navy, undated
https://www.navy.com/battle-of-midway
(US "Navy held their own in the Battle of Coral Sea. This was the first carrier-based fight of the war – a new type of engagement where opposing ships never actually saw or directly fired upon one another. The showdown at Midway was on the horizon")

Battle of the Coral Sea
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea
(May 4-8, 1942; at Coral Sea)

Quote: "The battle is historically significant as the first action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other, as well as the first in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other.

(d) Battle of Midway
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
(June 4-7 [actually ended on June 6. See (f)], 1942; section 2.3 Allied code-breaking)
(i) Only take to heart the first day of the Battle, when most of damage was done: June 4 to Americans but June 5 to Japanese (because Samoa time is right east of International Date Line).
(ii) Regarding the text -- read only section 2.3. The rest of the text in this Wiki page is hazy. For example, I wanted to know why Japan would invade Midway Atoll, but fail to grasp after reading it.

choi

(e) What was in Japan's mind when it attacked Midway Atoll?
(i) ミッドウェー海戦  (Midway 海戦)
https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E ... C%E6%B5%B7%E6%88%A6

Quote:

section 1 日本の作戦決定の背景, section 1.1 ハワイ攻略作戦の着想: "太平洋戦争開戦前、日本海軍は対米作戦における基本的な方針として守勢の邀撃作戦を採っていた。連合艦隊司令長官であった山本五十六大将は以前よりこの方針に疑問を持ち、独自の対米作戦構想として積極的な攻勢作戦を考えていた。* * * これは、まず国力から見て圧倒的な劣勢にある日本が守勢を採っても、時期・方面などを自主的に決めて優勢な戦力で攻撃するアメリカに勝ち目がなく、また短期戦に持ち込むためには、早期に敵の弱点を叩くことで相手国の戦意を喪失させる方法しか勝機を見出しえないと判断したためと言われている。さらに山本長官は太平洋戦争開戦前より、敵の空母部隊が日本を航空攻撃した場合、国内へ物質的な打撃だけでなく精神的な打撃が大きいと考えていた点も関係している。 * * * アメリカ海軍は、1941年（昭和16年）12月の真珠湾攻撃で太平洋艦隊主力の戦艦部隊が行動不能となった後、稼動状態にあった機動部隊を中部太平洋方面に出撃させ、日本軍拠点に対する一撃離脱戦法による襲撃を繰り返した。その度に日本軍は来襲の企図や方面の判断に悩まされた。日本軍はマーシャル諸島、ウェーク島、本土どれにも警戒処置をとっており、加えて戦力に余裕がなかったために哨戒は不十分であった。アメリカ軍の奇襲による被害は小さかったが、連合艦隊は受け身の作戦の困難性を認識した。

My translation: Before Pacific War, Imperial Japanese Navy (IPN) basically took the defensive posture relative to US. Adm Isoroku Yamamoto of Combined Fleet questioned it, instead taking offensive posture. * * * This [reversal] is because: First of all, in view of overwhelming inferiority of its national strength, even if Japan took defensive posture, with time and area (theaters) [as time dragged on and spheres involved expanded] there would be no way to win when facing America's assaults with overwhelmingly superior might. Also to lock in a short war, Japan must in early stage of twar hit the weaknesses, so that the opponent would lose the will to fight. Only this way can detect 勝機 chance of winning/ way to prevail. Furthermore, since before the War, Yamamoto thought that in case of enemy's aircraft carriers carrying out attacks on Japan, they would not just harm the resources to Japan but spirits. * * * American navy, having been incapacitated in the Pearl Harbor raid,  operated mobile forces to repeatedly harass mid-Pacific with hit-and-runs. Each time Japanese military was racked by intention of action and judgment of fields. Solomon, wake or home islands were all put on high alert. Additionally, there was no surplus military force so (ship) patrolling was insufficient. The ambushes conducted by American military caused small harms, but Combined Fleet recognized the difficulty of defensive/ passive posture.

section 1.2 ミッドウェー作戦 [Midway 作戦]: "日本海軍は、ミッドウェー島を占領してからの維持は極めて困難であると考えていた。あくまでこの作戦は米空母を誘い出して撃滅することを目的とし、さらに占領後には他方面で攻勢を行い、アメリカ軍にミッドウェー奪回の余裕を与えなければ10月のハワイ攻略作戦までミッドウェー島を確保できると考えた。

My translation: Japanese military knew that once taking Midway Atoll into possession, it would be extremely hard to keep [due to long supply line]. The ultimate goal of this battle was to induce US aircraft carriers to out and then annihilate them. Moreover, after occupation [of the atoll], Japan would fight in other spheres, thereby denying US military any room to retrieve Midway -- until the October [1942] battle to capture Hawaii so as to ensure safety of Midway.
(ii) James Bowen, The Carrier-Launched Doolittle Raid on Japan. In The Pacific War. Pacific War Historical Society, website last updated Nov 23, 2009.
www.pacificwar.org.au/carrierwarfare/Halsey_Doolittle.html

Quote:

"Early on the morning of 18 April 1942, when the American [Hornet] carrier force was still 700 miles (1,126 km) east of Tokyo, radar on the Enterprise ['which  would provide fighter cover for the task force during the long voyage'] detected one of the picket patrol boats manning Japan's eastern defensive perimeter. Although the Japanese picket boat was sunk by the cruiser USS Nashville, the commander of the carrier force, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, could not ignore the possibility that a radio warning had been sent by the picket boat to Tokyo. Rather than increase the risk to America's vital carriers, Halsey decided to launch the B-25 bombers 150 miles (240 km) short of the planned launching point. This decision greatly reduced the prospect of the B-25s reaching friendly forces in western China, but Lieutenant Colonel [James] Doolittle agreed with Halsey's decision.

"The raid persuaded Japan's Imperial General Headquarters that Admiral Yamamoto's concern for the safety of Japan's home islands was well founded, and that it was necessary to extend Japan's eastern defensive perimeter closer to Hawaii by seizing and occupying America's Midway islands in the central Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto had developed a complex plan for a Midway offensive to take place in June 1942. Yamamoto's plan was designed to extend Japan's eastern defensive perimeter to the Midway islands and draw the aircraft carriers of the United States Pacific Fleet to a decisive battle in the central Pacific. Yamamoto intended the capture of Midway and destruction of the US Pacific Fleet to be the foundation for a major Japanese offensive against Hawaii in October 1942.

* There is no need to read the rest.

(f) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
(section 2.3 Allied code-breaking: "As a result [of code-breaking], the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, all too widely separated to be able to support each other")

, whose introduction says, "There were seven aircraft carriers involved in the battle and all four of Japan's large aircraft carriers—Akagi 赤城 [named after 赤城山], Kaga 加賀 [after 加賀国 in ancient times], Sōryū 蒼竜 and Hiryū 飛竜 * * * —and a heavy cruiser were sunk, while the US lost only the carrier Yorktown [the other 2 US carriers were Enterprise and Hornet] and a destroyer."

All these four Japanese aircraft carriers were commanded by vice admiral Chūichi NAGUMO 南雲 忠一 中将, in one of the four task groups mentioned in the quotation of (f). The Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma 重巡洋艦 三隈 (named after a river 三隈川) was sunk on June 6 (American time; Japanese time: June 7), which it and other ships from other task groups came to rescue.
(g) Admiral Nimitz's mishap in a seaplane was real. See

Brayton Harris, Admiral Nimitz; The commander of the Pacific ocean theater. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, at page 113.
https://books.google.com/books?i ... 0mishap&f=false