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中国经济超越美国?'这一天可能永远不会到来'

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发表于 9-28-2022 15:14:08 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
(1) 孙承, 中国经济超越美国?'这一天可能永远不会到来.'  VOA Chinese, Sept 28, 2022.
https://www.voachinese.com/a/chi ... 220927/6766502.html
("世界银行星期二(9月27日)发布报告说,预计中国今年的国内生产总值GDP增长幅度仅为2.8%,远低于该行此前预测的5.0%。 * * * 中国官方最近的数据也显示,今年第二季度国内生产总值同比仅增长0.4%")

Note:
(a) A paragraph in this report states: "英国《经济学人》本月初的一篇评论说,几个世纪前,中国曾经是世界上最大的经济体,许多分析师预计它还会在某个适当的时候重获这一殊荣。但困扰这个亚洲巨人的一系列困境将推迟它超越美国的那一天,而且现在越来越多的经济学家认为,'这一天可能永远不会到来。' "
The commentary -- Will China's economy ever overtake America's?  Some economists think not. Sept 6, 2022 (under the heading "The Economist explains") -- is online only (not published in print), and locked behind paywall. But the first two paragraphs can be seen which said, "By one measure, China has already achieved that modest feat. Its GDP overtook America's in 2016 when translated into dollars at 'purchasing-power parity.' " So we are talking about China' nominal GDP (according to foreign exchange rate) that China may never overtake America/
(b) To make matter worse for China, US dollar appreciates over euro, British pound and renminbi -- because Federal Reserve in US, to battle inflation, has raised interest rates -- therefore attracting capitals from outside the US to come to America so as to earn higher interest rate. To do so (come into the US), the hot money has to be converted into US dollar, causing the latter's appreciation.

(2) East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (October 2022). World Bank, Sept 27, 2022
https://openknowledge.worldbank. ... 8053/FullReport.pdf

(a) Table 01 at page xxv (in the section Overview) shows
China's GDP growth rate for 2021 was 8.1%;
was forecast to be 5.0% for 2022 in its own (World Bank's own) East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (April 2022);
and is now forecast to be 2.8% for 2022 in East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (October 2022).

(b) Text at page 59 (in section 4 Outlook) states (in the first 1 1/2 paragraphs of section 4), "Growth in the EAP region is projected to decelerate from 7.2 percent in 2021 to 3.2 percent in 2022, which is about two percentage points slower than was expected in April 2022. The slowing growth is mostly due to China, where activity is projected to decelerate sharply to 2.8 percent in 2022, after the 8.1 percent rebound seen in 2021, owing to recurrent COVID-19 outbreaks, mobility restrictions, and real estate sector stress. Growth in the rest of the region is projected to rebound to 5.3 percent in 2022 from 2.6 percent in 2021, and up from 4.8 percent projected in April 2022 (table 3). This improvement reflects a recovery in domestic demand thanks to the relaxation of COVID-19 related restrictions as well as support from the strong goods export growth at the start of the year and the services export rebound expected in the latter part of 2022.

"The forecast assumes continued fiscal and monetary policy support in China but recognizes that its effectiveness will be limited by lingering COVID-19 outbreaks and mobility restrictions. Nevertheless, the severe Covid-19 related economic shock seen in China in the first half of 2022 is likely to be followed by a gradual bounce back in the second half of the year.

My comment: There is no need to read the rest. So the 2.8% forecast has nothing to do with economic trends in China, such as ageing.

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 楼主| 发表于 9-28-2022 15:14:57 | 显示全部楼层
(3)
(a) War jitters | The Peril of 'Peak China;' A new book warns America that a weakening China is more likely to invade [Taiwan]. The Economist, Sept 3, 2022
https://www.economist.com/china/ ... e-than-a-strong-one
("A new book by two American geostrategists argues that the acute peril is now. In 'Danger Zone: the Coming Conflict with China,' Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University and Michael Beckley of Tufts University * * * The authors thus flip the 'Thucydides trap' popularised by another professor, Graham Allison, who argued that China and America were destined for war in the same way a rising Athens and a fearful Sparta came to blows in antiquity. Messrs Brands and Beckley argue instead that the Athens of Thucydides was not an upstart, but a risen power fighting to avert decline. Imperial Japan's fearful of economic strangulation, leading to its surprise attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, is an example of such a 'peaking power trap.'  Both elements of the thesis -- that China is peaking and that war is imminent -- are contested by other analysts. Yet it captures something of the zeitgeist in Washington. Experts debates whether China's slowdown means it has hit the 'middle-income trap' * * * Many experts have come a cropper predicting China's collapse. Still, Messrs Brands and Beckley argues that its stellar growth resulted [note the past tense' from several factors that are now reversing. A demographic boom is turning to bust. Market reforms are yielding to a re-centralisation of the economy, the cowing of innovative tech firms and a struggle to control debt. A 'smarter autocracy' with slightly looser political controls has reverted to the more oppressive form, creating a techno-surveillance state. And instead of embracing China's rise, rich countries have started to constrain trade. Some economists, such as Thomas Orlik, argue that China's rulers have enough resources, regulatory levers and experience to avert a systemic crisis. A new edition of his book on China's economy, 'The Bubble that never Pops,' is about to be published.  In a commentary for Foreign Affairs, a journal, Oriana Skylar Mastro of Stanford University and Derek Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, argues that the hard fall is unlikely. China's relative decline, if it happens, is likely to be gradual, Its military power will keep growing. It will want to seize Taiwan, but need not lash out, Rising or peaking, China is liable to be more aggressive")
  
Note:
(i) Peak China is modeled after
peak oil
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil
, which said world oil (or petroleum) was being used up. I thought the theory was true but fracking later debunked it.  
(ii) come a cropper
https://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-com2.htm
(b) Vietnam's economy | Chain Reaction; Trade wars, a pandemic and deglobalisation have all failed to stop Vietnam's rise. The Economist, Sept 24, 2022
https://www.economist.com/asia/2 ... -of-deglobalisation
("Since 2000, Vietnam's GDP has grown faster than that of any Asian country bar China, averaging 6.2% per year. It has lured big foreign firms in droves. What started with apparel makers such as Nike and Adidas seeking low-skilled labour has turned into a boom in electronics—higher-value goods that create better-paid jobs for more highly skilled workers. In 2020 electronics made up 38% of Vietnam's goods exports, up from 14% of a much smaller pie in 2010 (see chart)/  The trade war between America and China, which started in 2018 has helped. In 2019 Vietnam produced nearly half of the $31bn-worth of American imports that moved from China to other low-cost Asian countries (though some of these goods were probably just modified Chinee-made ones stamped 'Made in Vietnam').  Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China's onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see why many big firms are turning to Vietnam. Apple's biggest suppliers, Foxconn and Pegatron * * * are building big factories in Vietnam * * * Other big names moving chinks of production from China to Vietnam includes Dell and HP (laptops), Google (phones) and Microsoft (Game consoles). * * * [its] GDO per person [is] $2,800 today * * * Vietnam has many things working in its favour. Its working force will remain young and sprightly as China's ages and shrinks. The country is an enthusiastic member of over a dozen free0trade agreements, giving its easier access to scores of national market. Its political leaders are less skittish about covid019 than China's, too. Vietnam opened its borers in March. China retains many barriers to entry.  The country of some 100m people also has geographical blessings * * * it is right on China's doorstep. Thanks to massive infrastructure spending on things like new roads, its electronics cluster is just a 12-hour drive from Shenzhen, China's tech capital. 'You don't have to reinvent your supply chains here,' says one industrial park operator. The government's knackdor staying cosy with both China and America is valuable, too.  [But Vietnamese suppliers for electronics produce some of the simplest that foreign firms want and are of poor quality.] Nor can Vietnam simply copy out of the playbook of China or South Korea. Globalisation is out of favour., Big markets are reshoring. Trade deals prohibit the state-aid tactics used by some other countries that went from poverty to prosperity. * * * workers are plentiful in Vietnam, but talented manager are rare, So are skilled technicians. * * * its vocational--training programmes need a boost. * * * It Vietnam is to grow as rich as China, let alone Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, it will ha to invest not only in infrastructure, but also in its people")

Note: "Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China's onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see * * *:
comes from "Add growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, [ii] China's onerous pandemic restrictions and [iii] its rising labour costs TO THAT, and it is easy to see * * * "
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