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板凳

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发表于 5-17-2025 11:51:26
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(3) Walter R Borneman, A Tale of Two Generals. When McArthur left the Philippines in 1942, Wainwright and his forces stayed back to fight the Japanese. McArthur never forgave him for capitulating to the enemy. Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2025, at page C7
https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture ... -at-bataan-f7083db7
(book review on Jonathan Horn, The Fate of the Generals; MacArthur, Wainwright, and the epic battle for the Philippines. Scribner, 2025)
Note:
(a) Bataan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataan
(map)
. whose accent is on the second syllable.
(b) If you do not have time, read the second half that starts with: "But in the first months of 1942."
Unlike Chinese emperors in millennia or Russians in World War II (both executed generals in defeat), Americans reward even generals who surrender.
(c) The review in print carries two photos:
(i) main photo with the caption: "USS MISSOURI Gen Douglas MacArthur signs the Japanese surrender documents on Sept 2, 1945. Gen Jonathan Wainwright standing behind him."
(photo attached at the bottom)
(ii) side photo with the caption: "POW MacArthur and an emaciated Wainwright in Yokohama, Japan, in August 1945."
Witnesses: Percival & Wainwright on V-J Day; On V-J Day, MacArthur invited two unexpected guests to witness the signing. The National WWII Museum, undated
https://www.nationalww2museum.or ... l-wainwright-vj-day
(photo caption: "MacArthur greets a gaunt Wainwright after the latter's release from Japanese captivity in August 1945. US Army photograph")
The side photo in the WSJ review is the same as the preceding photo in the museum.
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In the darkest days of World War II, Gens. Douglas MacArthur and Jonathan Wainwright faced unsurmountable odds. Only one of them, however, was responsible for their dilemma. Against the threat of Japanese invasion in 1941, MacArthur had convinced George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, that the long-held American strategy to defend the Philippines by concentrating forces around Manila was flawed and that MacArthur could protect the entire archipelago. Marshall approved, and MacArthur scattered his forces and supplies across Luzon and the other islands.
Only after Pearl Harbor did MacArthur acknowledge that the well-equipped, 200,000-man American-led Filipino army he had proposed existed solely under the brim of his gold-braided garrison cap. As he reversed his islands-wide deployment, the mad rush to move men and materiel to meet the invaders on the beaches of Luzon, and to fortify that island’s southwest peninsula of Bataan, put MacArthur’s field commanders, particularly Wainwright, in an untenable position.
Theatrical to a fault, MacArthur proclaimed he would never leave the Philippines except by direct presidential order. This he received in March 1942, and it led to his harrowing PT-boat escape from Corregidor. MacArthur chose to take his staff along, although the order did not include them. The “Bataan Gang” became MacArthur’s praetorian guard, eternally loyal to him and his view of the world. To most outsiders, however, they were sycophants operating on the fringes of reality.
Wainwright had his own circle of loyalists. He stood 6-foot-2 and weighed only 125 pounds when he entered West Point three years behind MacArthur. He acquired the nickname Skinny, and it stuck with him his entire career. Raised in a military family on frontier posts across the West, Wainwright, like MacArthur, was a 19th-century soldier confronting the new warfare of the 20th century. But, as Jonathan Horn tells us in “The Fate of the Generals: MacArthur, Wainwright, and the Epic Battle for the Philippines,” that is where his similarities with MacArthur ended.
Wainwright believed in an agile armed force. During his commencement speech to the graduates at Fort Riley’s Cavalry School in 1935, Wainwright argued that “mobility,” whether by horse or by mechanized vehicle, “must still remain our watchword.” When they received their orders, they “should be able to move out at once.” MacArthur’s standard mode of operation—at least early in the war—was the opposite of mobility and proved downright paralyzing in the hours immediately after Pearl Harbor.
But in the first months of 1942, when the American public desperately needed a hero and craved any hint that America was fighting back, MacArthur obliged. With a slew of communiques wrapped around his name alone, MacArthur swept aside criticism of his vacillations and engaged in misdirection. “Instead of having to answer” to the policymakers “for the loss of his air force or his whiplash-like shift” in war plans, Mr. Horn writes, they had to answer him “for failing to meet his demands for reinforcements.”
MacArthur led the public to believe he was outnumbered in the Philippines. In fact, the Japanese troops who made surprise landings at multiple points on Luzon numbered only half his force. Yet MacArthur’s penchant for hyperbole was never more misdirected than when he gave false hope to Wainwright’s men on Bataan during his lone visit there. Japan’s “temporary superiority of the air would soon be a thing of the past,” MacArthur promised, and he “would soon reoccupy Manila.” Wainwright knew better. He saw the future in the hollow eyes and sagging bellies of his men during his daily visits to the front.
Recounting battle scenes with riveting prose, Mr. Horn minces no words in his descriptions of the horrors of Bataan. The food stores that MacArthur had ordered to be held in reserve never made it to Bataan in sufficient quantities. Surrounded, malnourished and seemingly deserted by MacArthur, who had ordered them there, Wainwright’s troops became, as one correspondent labeled them, “the battling Bastards of Bataan.”
Two months after MacArthur escaped from Corregidor, Wainwright, placed by Marshall in overall command of the islands, had no choice but to surrender the Philippines or face mass extermination. MacArthur was livid. He never forgave Wainwright, thinking the surrender impugned MacArthur’s prior actions—which in many respects it did.
Shortly after MacArthur fled to Australia, Marshall recommended MacArthur for the Medal of Honor for his defense of the Philippines, an award calculated to boost American morale. After Wainwright’s surrender, amid rumors of the Bataan Death March, Marshall recommended Wainwright for his own Medal of Honor. It would show the world and Wainwright himself—who battled doubts and depression about how even his own family viewed him—that he had fought honorably. Opposition to the medal came from only one person—Douglas MacArthur. Wainwright’s actions did not measure up, MacArthur told Marshall, who chose to defer the award and avoid a wartime dispute with MacArthur.
After three years of captivity, an emaciated Wainwright was present at the Japanese surrender ceremony on the deck of USS Missouri, not because MacArthur had invited him, but because Marshall ordered it. Marshall also saw to it that Wainwright finally received the Medal of Honor, a medal, Mr. Horn concludes, that Wainwright did not need “to find honor.” For his part, Wainwright remained loyal to MacArthur throughout, refraining from any public criticism and even taking on the unenviable task of seconding MacArthur’s longshot bid for the 1948 Republican presidential nomination.
In presenting this dual biography, Mr. Horn, a former White House speechwriter whose books include a biography of Robert E. Lee, travels the well-trod path of MacArthur literature, including many quotations from MacArthur’s own “Reminiscences” (1964). What makes this study worthwhile is the author’s juxtaposition of what we have long known about MacArthur with the lesser-known actions and agonies endured by Wainwright. “The Fate of the Generals” lifts Jonathan Wainwright out of the shadow of Douglas MacArthur and “back into the light.” |
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